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1 Introduction 
With the increasing diffusion of modern information and communication 
technologies, network markets have become an omnipresent phenomenon. 
Innovations such as email, online auctions, and file sharing exhibit network 
externalities and play an important role in today’s economy. The econom-
ics literature offers a well-founded theory of network goods. Examples in-
clude  Besen/Farrel  (1994), David (1985), Farrel/Saloner (1986), 
Katz/Shapiro (1985; 1986; 1992) and Liebowitz/Margolis (1994). In this 
paper, we refer to this theory of network goods and relate it to studies about 
peer influence, a concept from the field of sociology or social psychology 
(see, e.g., Cialdini/Trust 1998). 
In network markets, the utility that a consumer derives from consumption 
of the good increases along with the number of other individuals consum-
ing the good (Katz/Shapiro 1985), a phenomenon commonly referred to as 
network externalities. In this paper, we establish and empirically test a the-
ory that disentangles the two mechanisms by which these network external-
ities drive the diffusion of an innovative network good. The first mecha-
nism builds on the individual’s own insight that his/her benefit increases 
with a larger number of installed units. An individual would adopt an inno-
vative network good if the number of installed units were large enough to 
create a substantial benefit. Those individuals already in the network matter 
only insofar as they increase the number of installed units. We name this 
mechanism installed-base-effect. The second mechanism works such that 
those who have already adopted the network good have an incentive to per-
suade others to also adopt the network good, because their own utility de-
pends strongly on their peers being in the network. With this mechanism, 
the individual's own insight that a large network creates substantial benefits 
is of less importance. The individual adopts the network good, because 
  3peers exert influence on the adoption decision. We label this mechanism 
peer-effect. 
A clear separation of these two mechanisms helps us to better understand 
how an innovative network good is diffused. It also has practical value for 
marketing managers, for whom network externalities may play an impor-
tant role. If, for example, network externalities are present in a market 
dominated by a large incumbent, a potential entrant into this market must 
take this fact into account. Absent an installed base, a potential customer 
faces substantial disadvantages with the entrant’s product compared to the 
incumbent’s. The entrant is obliged to offer compensation. For example, 
the entrant might offer a price discount to early adopters of the new stan-
dard or make her products available on a rental basis (Liebowitz/Margolis 
1990). Another strategy is to achieve compatibility with the incumbent’s 
product (Besen/Farrel 1994). 
In this paper we argue for a different approach. As we demonstrate, peer 
influence constitutes an important factor influencing the decision whether 
to adopt a network good. Therefore, a successful market entry strategy 
might be to count on peer influence to stimulate the diffusion of a new 
network product. For example, the entrant might advertise the product in a 
way that favors peer influence (e.g., Pechmann/Knight 2002) or might offer 
a bonus for those customers who successfully attract new customers. 
Our research design is as follows. We developed a questionnaire that 
measured the level of peer influence and the impact of the installed base 
with regard to the adoption of an innovative network product and con-
ducted a survey (N = 470). The aim of the survey was to measure the im-
pact of the peer- or the installed-base-effect on the adoption and diffusion 
of an innovative network good, Instant Messaging (IM). We analyzed the 
data using hazard rate models. 
  4Our study extends the literature in various aspects. (1) We develop a con-
ceptual framework to investigate how network externalities and peer influ-
ence interact with each other. In particular, we provide a rationale to ex-
plain why individuals might influence their peers to adopt a particular net-
work good. (2) We develop new scales to measure the impact of the in-
stalled base as well as the degree of peer influence. (3) For the adoption 
and diffusion of Instant Messaging our empirical evidence shows that peer 
influence has a stronger impact than does the more familiar installed-base-
effect. For Online Banking, a comparable innovation without network ex-
ternalities, this peer-effect seems to play no role. (4) We discuss the mar-
keting implications of our findings and suggest a set of possible market en-
try strategies into network markets. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the literature 
about network externalities and peer influence, and relates it to our research 
question. Section 3 describes Instant Messaging, the innovation covered in 
the survey. Section 4 lays out our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data 
set and the methods used in the empirical study. Section 6 reports the re-
sults. Section 7 discusses our results as well as the study’s limitations and 
provides some ideas for further research. Section 8 points out marketing 
implications. 
2  Theoretical Framework and Existing Literature 
2.1  Network Externalities 
The first articles in the field of network economics were inspired by the 
U.S. federal antitrust agency’s controversial decision to break up AT&T, 
by then the largest company in the world. Katz/Shapiro (1985) took up this 
case and developed a theory about the interrelation between network prod-
ucts and market competition. They differentiated between direct and indi-
rect network externalities. If the number of users of a particular product has 
a direct influence on the value of the product, then direct network external-
  5ities are present (e.g., in the case of the fax or the telephone). In contrast, if 
the quality of the product is influenced by the diffusion of another product, 
then indirect network externalities prevail (e.g., the relation between com-
puter hardware and computer software). Inspired by Katz/Shapiro (1985), 
two approaches and two strands of mainly theoretical studies developed 
(Economides 1996). The first strand, which uses a macro approach, as-
sumes network externalities as given and models their consequences on 
competition, market entry, technology adoption, etc. Examples are articles 
by Katz/Shapiro (1986; 1992), which study technology adoption or product 
introduction in the presence of network externalities. The second group of 
studies addresses the specific microstructure of a network. It uses the per-
spective of a producer of a network good and deals with questions of com-
patibility and coordination (e.g., Besen/Farrell 1994) 
On the empirical side, there are two main ways to measure direct network 
externalities (Clement 1999): studies that measure direct network external-
ities by means of hedonic pricing (e.g., Brynjolfson/Kemerer 1996; Gandal 
1994), and studies that measure direct network effects by the size of the 
installed base (e.g., Kim/Kwon 2003; Saloner/Shepard 1995; 
Shankar/Bayus 1997). Our study differs, in that it represents an attempt to 
measure the effects of network externalities on the micro-level. However, 
our aim is not to measure the degree of direct network externalities in itself, 
but to focus on its impact on technology adoption in the form of the two 
mechanisms introduced above, the installed-base- or the peer-effect. 
2.2 Peer  Influence 
The concept of peer influence focuses on the relationship between the 
adopter and his/her social environment. When individuals are together in 
groups, they exercise influence on each other (Cialdini/Trust 1998). There 
are two competing perspectives on how peer influence affects an individ-
ual’s behavior. An individual might agree with another individual’s opinion 
  6because he or she was persuaded by the arguments (informational influ-
ence) or because he or she concedes to some kind of social pressure (nor-
mative influence) (Cialdini/Trust 1998). Peer influence as a concept is dis-
cussed in a variety of disciplines including sociology, psychology, and con-
sumer behaviour research. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the concept 
has not been applied to the adoption of network goods. Our purpose is to 
find out about the influence that peers might exert on an individual that has 
not yet adopted a particular network good, Instant Messaging. 
On a conceptual basis, peer influence is related to and partially overlaps 
with peer pressure, word-of-mouth effects, and social contagion. Unfortu-
nately, these concepts are not used in a consistent way in either the litera-
ture or across different disciplines. Therefore, some further clarifications 
and explanations appear necessary to describe what exactly we aim to 
measure in our study. 
Peer pressure: Peers might persuade an individual to behave in a way in 
which he originally did not intend to (e.g., the individual starts to smoke 
which he would otherwise not have started). This behavior is referred to as 
peer pressure and can be broken down into a “good” and a “bad” type. 
With “bad” peer pressure, the individual is coerced to act against her own 
will, but with “good” peer pressure she is pushed into something she either 
did not have the courage to do or simply had not thought about. The dis-
tinction draws on the following: with “good” peer pressure, the individual 
perceives her action - at least from an ex-post perspective - as a good thing 
to do, while with “bad” peer pressure this is not the case. However, we note 
that the meaning of peer pressure differs substantially, according to the dis-
cipline concerned: in sociology, the term is mainly used in its negative 
connotation. Some sociological studies analyse the impact of peer pressure 
on smoking, drug, and alcohol use (e.g., Halebsky 1987; Melby et al. 1993). 
In some economics studies, peer pressure is regarded as a way to overcome 
the free-rider problem associated with teams (e.g., Falk/Ichino 2006; Kan-
  7del/Lazear 1992). Peer pressure serves here as a motivational device, deter-
ring the individual to shirk on her fellow team members, which is, at least 
from a welfare perspective, something positive.  
For our study, we do not know about the original motivation of the poten-
tial adopter. In particular, we do not know whether she originally wanted to 
adopt the network good or not, and whether or not she later found that the 
adoption decision was beneficial. Since our primary interest is in under-
standing the drivers of the adoption decision rather than the consequences 
for each individual, we speak of peer influence rather than peer pressure, 
because peer influence has a less judgmental connotation. 
Word-of-mouth: The effect of peer influence must be separated from word-
of-mouth communication. The latter concerns a communication channel; 
peer influence is about interpersonal influence. Some innovation diffusion 
models differentiate between mass-media communication and communica-
tion by word-of-mouth. These models assume that the former mainly af-
fects early entrants (the innovators), but that the latter impacts only later 
entrants (the imitators). For an example, see Tanny/Derzko (1988) in their 
extension of the model by Bass (1969). With word-of-mouth communica-
tion, information is passed by verbal means in an informal way from person 
to person, rather than by mass media such as radio, television, or newspa-
pers (Rogers 2003, 205). Word-of-mouth communication is central for in-
terpersonal influence (e.g., Mahajan et al.  1990). Therefore, peer influence 
is likely to happen by word-of-mouth communication, but not every infor-
mal interpersonal communication will result in peer influence. 
Social contagion: The idea of social contagion, which is prominent in the 
(sociological) innovation diffusion literature, is related, but not equivalent, 
to the concept of peer influence. In its most general sense, social contagion 
means that the behavior of a potential adopter is a function of another ac-
tors’ knowledge, attitude, or behavior concerning the innovation (Van den 
  8Bulte/Lilien 2001). The idea of social contagion was originally brought 
forward by Coleman et al. (1966) in their classic study on the diffusion of 
tetracycline, an antibiotic drug. Inspired by this landmark study, research-
ers have offered different causal mechanisms of social influence, among 
which are information transfer, normative pressures, and network effects. 
The argument about information transfer basically concerns an update of 
beliefs about an innovation’s costs and benefits. Witnessing another per-
son’s adoption behavior conveys significant information. The potential 
adopter not only becomes aware of the innovation itself, but also learns 
about the consequences of its adoption. In this way, a person’s social net-
work influences the diffusion of an innovation in a social system (for a 
prominent example, see Chatterjee/Eliashberg 1990). The other two expla-
nations - normative pressures and network effects - directly relate to the 
content of our study. Normative pressures concern the peer effect, and net-
work effects concern the installed-base-effect. In a nutshell, the concept of 
social contagion offers many more causal mechanisms than just peer influ-
ence and network externalities, the two concepts we analyze. 
In our study, we want to find out whether a not-yet-adopter of a particular 
network good is drawn into the network by his peers and how this effect 
compares to the installed-base-effect. We do not investigate whether the 
peers exert their influence by means of word-of-mouth or whether the not-
yet-adopters perceive this influence as “good” or “bad.” 
Because we discuss the marketing implications of our findings (see section 
8), below, we sketch some particular pieces of research from the consumer 
behavior literature. In this literature, peer influence is mentioned in several 
ways. Bearden/Etzel (1982) categorize goods along two dimensions: first, 
according to whether they are commodities or luxury goods, and second, 
according to whether they are consumed in public or in private. 
Bearden/Etzel (1982) show that the strongest degree of peer influence takes 
place in the category of luxury good/consumption in public, and the weak-
  9est degree of peer influence occurs in the category of commod-
ity/consumption in private. In a replication and extension of 
Bearden/Etzel’s (1982) study, Childers/Rao (1992) show that the influence 
of various reference groups varies with product type. A familial reference 
group has a greater impact on the consumption decision of privately con-
sumed goods, and a peer-based reference group mainly influences con-
sumption decisions of publicly consumed goods. It seems that family 
members have greater influence in situations in which peers have less in-
fluence, and vice versa. Other recent studies on peer-based group influence 
on purchase decisions are, e.g., Luo (2005) and Mangleburg et al. (2004). 
3  The Innovation in the Survey: Instant Messaging 
Instant Messaging, as we know it today, was invented in 1996 by four Is-
raeli programmers, who started ICQ, an acronym for “I seek you.” Today, 
Instant Messaging is a popular form of communication on the Internet. In 
2004, more than 53 million U.S. adults were reported to use Instant Mes-
saging regularly (Shiu/Lenhard 2004). The market for Instant Messaging is 
dominated by three big players: AOL, which also owns ICQ, Yahoo!, and 
Microsoft’s MSN. None of these companies currently makes any money 
with Instant Messaging. However, the technology is regarded as crucial, 
since it is one vehicle for Internet telephony (The Economist 2005). Instant 
Messaging allows for real-time communication between its users. A user 
can send messages to anyone on his contact list and the message pops up 
immediately on the other user’s computer screen. But in order to exchange 
messages, both users have to be members of the same network (e.g., the 
AOL or MSN network). Thus, we expect Instant Messaging to exhibit 
strong direct network externalities. Instant Messaging is virtually free of 
charge. Any person can register for free with ICQ, MSN or any other In-
stant Messaging service. 
  10To support informal communication among co-workers, firm-internal In-
stant Messaging services are installed in many workplaces. The main ad-
vantages of Instant Messaging are its speed, the brevity of its messages, 
and characteristics that promote multitasking (Isaacs et al. 2002). How-
ever, in this paper, we concentrate on the social use of Intant Messaging, 
e.g., keeping in touch with friends (Nardi et al. 2002). 
Technically, Instant Messaging resembles a star network (e.g., Economides 
1996). The service provider maintains a server, and all members of the In-
stant Messaging network log in to this main server. If two members of the 
network want to communicate with each other, they must be logged in to 
the server at the same time. For Instant Messaging to be of any value, there 
should be at least two persons logged in simultaneously. Therefore, we can 
perceive Instant Messaging as a network good. 
  114 Hypothesis  Development 
Assume that a consumer adopting a network good has gross benefits of 
u(N) and net benefits of u(N)-p, where N denotes the number of network 
members, and p describes the price. To exhibit positive direct network ex-








N u . 
The consumer’s utility increases along with the size of the network (N). 
Thus, as long as her marginal benefit of having a larger network exceeds 
her marginal cost of persuading a friend to join, then each consumer in the 
network has a strong incentive to persuade another person to join the net-
work. We assume the consumer’s marginal benefit from a new network 
member to decrease in N, i.e.,  0 < NN u . For the adoption and diffusion of a 
network good, the following statement should be true: 
If positive direct network externalities prevail, then peer influence 
should arise and, ceteris paribus, stimulate the adoption and diffu-
sion of a network good (peer-effect). 
The source and the intensity of peer influence should change along with the 
diffusion of the network good. In the beginning, when only few people are 
in the network, the benefit from attracting new network members should be 
greater than at a later stage. Thus, we should observe intensive peer influ-
ence exerted by a small number of people. At a later stage, the situation 
should be different. The marginal benefit of attracting new network mem-
bers is small, leading to a lower level of peer influence than at the earlier 
stage. On the other hand, the network community is larger than at the be-
ginning, and more network members might exert influence. 
  12As denoted in equation (1), with network goods, the consumer‘s utility de-
pends on the size of the network (N). A larger utility from consuming the 
product should in turn have a positive impact on the adoption decision. 
Thus, there should also be a direct link between network externalities and 
adoption behavior. The following should hold: 
  If positive direct network externalities prevail, then the utility from 
consuming the good increases with its installed base. A higher utility 
should in turn stimulate the further adoption and diffusion of the 
good (installed-base-effect). 
  13Figure 1 conceptualizes the mechanisms described above. 
Insert figure 1 about here. 
Given this conceptual framework, we derive two hypotheses related to our 
survey. 
Following our general statement on the interrelation between network ex-
ternalities and peer influence, and the resulting peer-effect, peer influence 
should be crucial to the adoption of a network good. Therefore, if the par-
ticipants perceive Instant Messaging as a network good, hypothesis 1 
should hold. 
Hypothesis 1:   The propensity to adopt Instant Messaging increases 
with a higher level of peer influence (peer-effect). 
For the installed-base-effect of network externalities and the adoption or 
diffusion of Instant Messaging, we formulate hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2:   The propensity to adopt Instant Messaging increases 
with a higher level of perceived direct network exter-
nalities (installed-base-effect). 
We do not explicitly formulate the question of whether the one or the other 
effect dominates as a hypothesis, but it is nevertheless of great interest, 
since it has important implications on marketing strategy. 
5 Empirical  Study 
5.1   Data 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an online survey with altogether 470 
participants. The survey took place between the 25
th of December 2004 and 
the 16
th of January 2005. The sample is biased towards young age groups, 
which is explained by the fact that mostly students were asked. However, 
  14this bias should only be a minor problem, since the user community for In-
stant Messaging is also very young (Shiu/Lenhard 2004). For a more de-
tailed description of the survey’s participants, see table A1. 
Our questionnaire was of a retrospective type, meaning that the participants 
were asked to answer the questions from the perspective of the moment 
when they decided about whether or not to adopt Instant Messaging. In par-
ticular, the participants were asked whether they adopted the innovation 
and, if applicable, in which year they did so. Those who did not know 
about the innovation concerned were directed to the questions concerning 
the background of the individual. The constructs were operationalized by 
means of single- and multi-item measures, where we used a 6-point Likert 
scale ranging from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (6).
1 The 
operationalization is displayed in detail in table A4. With this retrospective 
survey, we created an unbalanced pseudo-panel data set. 
To find out whether the participant perceived the size of the installed base 
(i.e., the number of individuals who have already adopted) as important, 
she was asked to answer the following statement: 
Insert table 1 about here 
With regard to peer influence, the participants were asked to evaluate a 
statement concerning the influence of their social network at the moment 
when they decided about the adoption. If they were inspired, invited, or 
                                                 
1   We entered the multi-item measures into the hazard rate model as index 
variables (mean of corresponding items). We did not enter factor analysis 
scores, since doing so would make a comparison with the single-item 
measures difficult. The Cronbach α-values that we calculate nevertheless 
indicate the constructs’ internal consistencies (table A4). 
  15even pressured by their friends to register, a high degree of peer influence 
was at work. The following item was used:
2
Insert table 2 about here. 
As control variables, we included questions about the following constructs: 
•  Variables inseparably linked with the innovations concerned such as 
the Rogers criteria (perceived original benefit, perceived compatibil-
ity, perceived complexity, perceived trialability and perceived com-
municability of the innovation; Rogers 2003, 15-16), the perceived 
risk attached to the innovation (Bauer 1960), and variables capturing 
possible indirect network externalities between the innovation and 
other related products.
3 
•  Variables linked to the personality of the participant, such as her de-
sire to be innovative, psychographic attributes (opinion leadership) 
as well as various socio-demographic variables (gender, age, occupa-
tion, etc.). 
                                                 
2   In addition, we included an item related to word-of-mouth communica-
tion into the questionnaire and found it to be strongly correlated with the 
item related to peer influence (r = 0.69). This is consistent with the view 
that peer influence is most likely to occur due to word-of-mouth commu-
nication. In order to separate word-of-mouth effects from peer influence, 
we excluded the word-of-mouth construct from the regression. However, 
the results reported below do not qualitatively change if word-of-mouth 
effects are included in the peer-effects construct. 
3   To control for indirect network effects, we asked the participant to name 
which other Internet-applications she uses (online auctions, file sharing, 
etc.). 
  16In several aspects our questionnaire resembles the questionnaire of Litfin 
(2000), who studied the adoption and diffusion on an innovative telecom-
munication service. Our questionnaire (in German) is available from the 
corresponding author. 
5.2 Method 
To study the individual duration until the adoption, we estimate a hazard 
rate model. Because our survey measures duration until adoption in discrete 
time intervals (years), we specify a discrete time model. In addition, given 
that diffusion processes can best be described by a logistic function 
(Griliches 1957; Stoneman 2002), we assume that the cumulative distribu-
tion of all adoption decisions over time is logistic. We specify duration de-
pendence as flexible piecewise constants (DURAT1-DURAT10). Doing so 
implies that we do not need to assume that all individuals will adopt the 
innovation as time approaches infinity. To estimate the model, we follow 
Jenkins (1995) and take advantage of the close relation between general-
ized linear models and discrete time hazard rate models. Technically, we 
perform the estimation with STATA’s xtlogit command, which we apply to 
the survey data reorganized in person-period format.
4
We are interested in the probability of the participant exiting the status of 
non-adopter at t, given that he did not adopt until t (hazard rate). We spec-
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4   The data-file as well as the STATA
® log-file can be requested from the 
corresponding author. 
  17where   is the hazard rate in period v with  (| ) hv X 1 vv tt − t ≤ <  for  ,  2,..., vV = v θ  
is a vector of dummy variables such that  1 v θ =  if  1 vv tt − t ≤ <  and  0 v θ = . Oth-
erwise,  v α  is the period-specific baseline hazard rate.  β  denotes the pa-
rameter vector relating to the individual vector of covariates  X , and 
 denotes individuals in the sample.  1,..., i = N
The individual level error component  i δ  controls for the potential influence 
of unobserved individual characteristics on the hazard rate. Following the 
usual conventions, we model random individual effects and assume that  i δ  
is normally distributed with zero mean and independence of  i δ  with all ob-
servable characteristics. Conveniently, this model also allows us to measure 
the extent to which unobserved individual characteristics influence the tim-
ing of adoption decisions. The relative importance of  i δ  is measured as 
, which is the proportion of the total unexplained variance 
contributed by individual-specific effects (Wooldridge 2002). 
22 /( 1) δδ ρσ σ =+
6 Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the hazard rate analysis. Table A2 displays the 
correlations between the covariates. After excluding all observations with 
missing values, we obtain a sample size of 370. The final estimation sam-
ple consists of 282 adopters and 88 non-adopters. The adoption curve 
peaked in the year 2000, which is consistent with the findings of other stud-
ies.
5
We find no significant unobserved individual effects in the hazard rate re-
gression (table 3), i.e.  ρ  is not significantly different from zero. Hence, the 
                                                 
5  Köllinger (2003, 480) reports the number of new Internet users in Ger-
many to peak between 2000 and 2001. Internet access is a prerequisite for 
Instant Messaging. 
  18timing of adoption decisions in the sample is comprehensively explained 
by the observed variables.
6 The data analyses yield the following results: 
Insert table 3 about here. 
Hypothesis 1: Peer-effect of Network Externalities 
There exists peer influence with Instant Messaging, and this influence var-
ies considerably across the participants of the survey. The respective item 
has a mean of 3.35 (table A4), showing that the group of adopters has a sta-
tistically significant higher mean (3.75) than does the group of non-
adopters (1.91) (table A3).
7 Peer influence has a strong impact on the diffu-
sion of instant messaging.  
Hypothesis 1 is confirmed by econometric results. The ß-coefficient in the 
hazard rate model is 0.198 with p<0.01 (table 3). According to this result, a 
higher degree of peer influence has a positive impact on the participant’s 
hazard rate, i.e., her probability of exiting the status of non-adopter at t, 
given that she did not adopt until t. This result is in line with other qualita-
tive evidence. For example, Grinter/Palen (2002) find that Instant Messag-
ing communications are “mostly restricted to one’s ‘real space friends’ and 
that its adoption is best described as group wise”. 
                                                 
6   Thus, the remaining unexplained variance is purely random and not due 
to omitted variables. 
7  A two-sided t-test about the equality of means is rejected with p<0.001. 
  19Hypothesis 2: Installed-base-effect of Network Externalities 
The results of the hazard rate analysis do not support hypothesis 2. The ß-
coefficient in the hazard rate model is statistically nonsignificant at -0.097 
(table 3). Hence, it seems that the expectations about the installed base (ta-
ble 1) did not have a decisive influence on the adoption decision. This re-
sult is surprising, but it accords with the findings of Litfin (2000, 306), who 
does not find an adoption stimulating influence of the size of the installed 
base on the diffusion of an innovative telecommunication service. It seems 
that the impact of network externalities on the diffusion of a network good 
is not as straightforward as some articles from the field of network theory 
suggest (e.g., Katz/Shapiro 1986; 1992). 
In a nutshell, the peer-effect clearly dominated the installed-base-effect. 
The participants were pulled into the network by their friends, rather than 
adopting it just because of their own insight that a larger network would 
offer them a greater benefit. 
We tested our theory and our operationalization of the two effects by ap-
plying the same questionnaire to a comparable non-network product, 
Online Banking (see table A5). In this case, we could find no impact of 
peer influence, providing further evidence for our theory about the interre-
lation between network externalities and peer influence. 
Impact of Control Variables 
The inclusion of the control variables yields some interesting results: the 
perceived risk attached to the adoption of Instant Messaging seemed to play 
an important role. The ß-coefficient in the hazard rate model is -0.41 with 
p<0.001 (table 3). It seems that worries about being affected with a com-
puter virus, problems of data protection, or distraction from other things 
caused individuals to adopt Instant Messaging at a later point in time. The 
original benefit of Instant Messaging (e.g., its speed) seemed to have no 
impact on the adoption decision, which supports the idea of Instant Mes-
  20saging being a network good. Furthermore, the perceived degree of the ef-
fectiveness of the innovation’s trialability, the participant’s innovativeness, 
and the degree of indirect network externalities seemed to have an adop-
tion-stimulating impact, but a higher age seemed to hinder adoption. We 
find that the degree of opinion leadership has no significant impact on the 
adoption decision. 
  217  Discussion, Limitations, and Further Research 
We find empirical support for our theory claiming that peer influence con-
stitutes an important factor in the adoption of an innovative network good, 
because the users of a network good have an incentive to convince others to 
purchase the same product, given that their utility depends on the number 
of other users. This peer influence turns out to have a stronger impact on 
adoption decisions than does the installed-base-effect, based on the indi-
vidual’s insight that a larger number of users increases her benefit. Also, 
we find that peer influence had no significant influence on the adoption de-
cision of a comparable innovation without network effects. This finding 
suggests that in some cases, the degree of peer influence on the adoption 
decisions can be partially explained by network externalities. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by providing a conceptualization 
about the interrelation between network externalities and peer influence, by 
developing and testing scales measuring the two constructs, and by provid-
ing a straightforward explanation of peer influence in network markets. 
From the perspective of the practitioner, the findings have important impli-
cations for marketing strategy (see section 8). 
Our empirical research design suffers from two limitations. First, we esti-
mated our models with a pseudo-panel data set generated through a retro-
spective survey. Retrospective surveys depend crucially on the participant’s 
memory, which might sometimes bias the results (Schnell et al. 2005, 233). 
Second, the covariates are time-invariant. The reason is that pre-test inter-
views showed that the participants were not able to answer the questions in 
a time-variant manner. 
Further research seems warranted to investigate how network externalities 
and peer influence interact with each other. In this context, potential re-
search questions could be: What is the personality of the person who exerts 
peer influence? What is the personality of the person who is susceptible to 
  22peer influence? How can a person be motivated to exert peer influence 
stimulating the diffusion of a particular network product? Because we as-
sume that the innovation-decision process occurs in stages, at what stage 
does peer influence interfere? 
It would also be interesting to learn more about the impact of peer influ-
ence on adopting other network goods such as internet telephony or a mem-
bership in a sports club. From a model-theoretical perspective, it might be 
interesting to develop a model about the interrelation between peer influ-
ence and network externalities. 
  238 Marketing  Implications 
In the field of marketing strategy, there is a wide range of literature on first-
mover advantages (see Kerin et al. 1992 for an extensive overview). From 
an industrial organization perspective, the first-mover advantage can be 
explained by the barriers-to-entry concept. Von Weizsäcker (1980, 400) de-
scribes a barrier to entry as a “cost of producing which must be borne by a 
firm which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in 
the industry”. In our particular example of a network market, the barrier to 
entry is less a cost of production, and more an additional cost of distribu-
tion. The incumbent or early mover has the benefit of a larger network size,  
resulting in peer influence in favor of her product. To enter the market suc-
cessfully, the follower must find a way to reduce this peer influence. Possi-
ble strategies from the literature on network economics range from estab-
lishing compatibility with the incumbent’s product (Besen/Farrel 1994) or 
offering a guarantee of satisfaction or a price discount (Liebowitz/Margolis 
1994). A common factor in these strategies is that they all try to reduce the 
degree or the impact of the incumbent’s installed-base-advantage. 
However, since it is the peer-effect and not the installed-base-effect of net-
work externalities that influences the adoption decision in our case, another 
approach might also produce good results. A good strategy might be to cre-
ate favorable conditions that increase peer influence, thus stimulating the 
adoption of a product such as consumption in public, commercials embed-
ding peers
8 or giving early adopters an incentive to attract new customers. 
Another strategy might be to concentrate the efforts of market entry on so-
cially proximate groups such as, e.g., ethnic minorities. Peer influence 
                                                 
8   Several marketing scholars analyze the joint effects of advertising and 
peers and find that the perception of the product depends significantly on 
that the advertisement shows peers consuming the product (e.g., Pech-
mann/Knight 2002; Andrews et al. 2005). 
  24should have a greater impact here than among less socially proximate 
groups. 
  25Appendix 
Insert tables A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 about here. 
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Utility increases with N 
Other Factors: 
-  Luxury goods/Consumption in 
Public 
-  Composition of Social Network 
-  Situational Environment 
-  Behaviour on which Peer Influ-
ence focuses 




-  Age 
-  Gender 
-  Occupation 
-  ... 
Product’s Original Attributes:
-   Original Benefit 
-  Observability 
-  Trialability 
-  … 
Personality of the  
Adopter: 
-  Opinion Leadership 
-  Innovativeness 
-  … 
Positive Direct Network Externalities 
Perceived by 
Adopter 
Perceived by  
Not-yet-adopter 
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Table 1: Construct Installed Base 
    
Item Statement  Scale 
1  The diffusion of Instant Messaging among my friends in-






Table 2: Construct Peer Influence 
    
Item Statement  Scale 
1  I was (am) inspired out of my social network to register with 
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Table 3: Random Effects Hazard Rate Regression Results  
 
Dependent Variable: Adoption Status in Year t 
Independent Variables  Coefficient     Standard Error 
DURAT2    -0.094     0.433 
DURAT3     1.189**     0.391 
DURAT4     2.168***     0.484 
DURAT5     2.616***     0.614 
DURAT6     2.666***     0.744 
DURAT7     2.917***     0.864 
DURAT8     3.308***     0.978 
DURAT9     3.577***     1.077 
DURAT10     0.652     1.470 
INSTALLED BASE    -0.097     0.070 
PEER INFLUENCE     0.198**     0.063 
RISK    -0.410***     0.126 
TRIALABILITY     0.228*     0.110 
INNOVATIVENESS     0.325**     0.115 
ORIGINAL BENEFIT     0.106     0.086 
MALE     0.203     0.170 
AGE    -0.026 
†    0.015 
OPINION LEADERSHIP     0.092     0.069 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 1 
   1.161**     0.439 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 2 
   0.184     0.275 
CONSTANT    -5.495***     1.207 
Number of participants     370   
Number of observations     2,362   
Observations per group     
Min.    1   
Avg.    6.4   
Max.    10   
  
Minus log likelihood     679.89   
Wald chi² (20)     57.74   
   Likelihood-ratio-test     p < 0.001   
    
  34   Likelihood-ratio-test of rho = 0 is not rejected on a conventional level 
   (p=0.471). 
 
Note: Asterisks indicate that coefficient is significantly different form 
zero at the 10 percent (
†), 5 percent (*), 1 percent (**), or 0.1 percent 
(***) level. 
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Table A1: Description of Sample 
 
Sample Composition 
Number of Persons Asked: 470 
Final Sample: 370 
Adopter/Non-Adopter: Adopter (283); Non-Adopter (87) 
Age: Median (25); Mode (25); Min. (14); Max. (70); Mean (27.69); SD (6.98) 
Gender: Male (259); Female (111) 
Occupation: 71.4% are students. 
 
Note: We also asked about the adoption of online banking. As many of the re-
spondents were not able to answer questions about Instant Messaging, the sam-
ple size is reduced from 470 to 370 participants. 
 
 Table A2: Correlations 
 
   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11 
1    INSTALLED BASE        .270**  -.062**   .199**   .224**    .303**   .066**  -.276**   .158**   .185**    .111** 
2    PEER INFLUENCE    .270**    -.200**   .265**   .196**    .395**  -.045*   -.217**   .057**   .333**    .119** 
3    RISK   -.062**  -.200**    -.133**  -.055**   -.233**  -.046*    .162**  -.047*   -.333**   -.119** 
4    TRIALABILITY    .199**   .265**  -.133**     .141**    .382**   .032   -.272**   .021    .215**    .030 
5    INNOVATIVENESS    .224**   .196**  -.055**   .141**     .297**   .123**  -.138**  .103**    .283**    .250** 
6    ORIG.BENEFIT    .303**   .395**  -.233**   .382**   .297**     -.142**  -.343**   .115**   .289**    .159** 
7    MALE    .066**  -.045*   -.046*    .032    .123**   -.142**     .135**   .138**   .224**    .162** 
8    AGE   -.276**  -.217**   .162**  -.272**  -.138**   -.343**   .135**    -.000   -.260**    .006 
9    OP. LEADERSHIP    .158**   .057**  -.047*    .021    .103**    .115**   .138**  -.000      .185**    .190** 
10  INTERNETAPPL1    .185**   .333**  -.333**   .215**   .283**    .289**   .224**  -.260**   .185**     .280** 




**   The correlation is significant on a 1 percent level. 
*     The correlation is significant on a 5 percent level. 
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Table A3: Descriptive Statistics 
      
Mean (SD)  Variable 
  Adopter    Non-Adopter 
  p-value  
  (test for equality of  
   means) 
  Min.   Max.
INSTALLED BASE    4.24 (1.54)    3.80 (1.58)    0.024    1    6 
PEER INFLUENCE    3.81 (1.61)    1.94 (1.21)    0.000    1    6 
RISK*    2.67 (1.03)    3.97 (1.10)    0.000    1    6 
TRIALABILITY    5.09 (0.85)    4.16 (1.31)    0.000    1    6 
INNOVATIVENESS    2.18 (1.35)    1.47 (0.76)    0.000    1    6 
ORIGINAL BENEFIT*    4.31 (0.97)    3.16 (1.01)    0.000    1    6 
MALE    0.71 (0.45)    0.67 (0.47)    0.439    0    1 
AGE    24.51 (5.59)    29.54 (9.31)    0.000    14    70 
OPINION LEADERSHIP*    3.72 (1.24)    3.51 (1.03)    0.148    1    6 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 1* 
  0.46 (0.30)    0.18 (0.21)    0.000    0    1 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 2* 
  0.18 (0.31)    0.07 (0.20)    0.003    0    1 
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate that we construct the variable by taking the mean of several single items (table A4);  
            N: 370 Table A4: Operationalization of Constructs 
 
Construct INSTALLED BASE 
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  The diffusion of Instant Messaging among my friends in-




Construct PEER INFLUENCE  
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 







Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  I was afraid to infect my computer with a virus.  2.89 (1.64) 
2  Regarding the registration, I worried about problems of data 
protection. 
3.19 (1.55) 
3  I was afraid that the Instant Messenger could distract me 
from doing other things. 
2.81 (1.58) 
Cronbach α = 0.60; Explained Variance = 56.43% 
 
Construct TRIALABILITY 
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  Without great effort, I was able to try the Instant Messenger.  4.87 (1.08) 
 
Construct INNOVATIVENESS (of Adopter) 
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  I wanted to be among the first who register.  2.02 (1.29) 
 
Construct ORIGINAL BENEFIT (ORIG.BENEFIT) 
2
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  Compared to other modes of communication, the Instant 
Messenger was more comfortable. 
3.64 (1.50) 
  392  Via the Instant Messenger, I was able to communicate faster 
than via email. 
4.84 (1.39) 
3  The benefits of a registration with the Instant Messenger 
were obvious. 
3.72 (1.41) 
Cronbach α = 0.631; Explained Variance = 57.38% 
 
Construct OPINION LEADERSHIP (OP.LEADERSHIP) 
1.,2
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  My friends often come to me for advice.  3.82 (1.35) 
2  I often influence the purchase decisions of my friends.  3.57 (1.32) 
3  People come to me more often that I go to them for informa-
tion about new acquisitions. 
3.60 (1.42) 
Cronbach α = 0.86; Explained Variance = 77.5% 
 
Construct INTERNET-APPLICATIONS 1 (INTERNETAPPL1) 
2
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  I send SMS by Internet (yes/no).  0.45 (0.50) 
2  I download videos from the Internet (yes/no).  0.36 (0.48) 
3  I play online games (yes/no).  0.30 (0.46) 
4  I download music from the Internet (yes/no).  0.53 (0.50) 
5  I visit newsgroups (yes/no).  0.28 (0.45) 
Cronbach α = 0.62; Explained Variance = 41.13% 
 
Construct INTERNET-APPLICATIONS 2 (INTERNETAPPL2) 
2
Item Statement  Mean  (SD) 
1  I use Internet-telephony (yes/no).  0.20 (0.40) 
2  I use a webcam (yes/no).  0.12 (0.33) 




1 We obtain the scale from a marketing scales handbook, edited by  
  Bruner/Hensel (1992, 292). For this scale, Dickerson/Gentry (1983)  
  report a Cronbach α of 0.6.
 
                   2 We include the construct in the multivariate analysis as an index variable 
  40               (mean of corresponding single item measures). We report the Cron- 
               bach α to demonstrate the degree of the construct’s internal consistency. 
 
3  We construct the variable MALE as a yes/no-question. 
 
4  Adopters received the questions in past tense. Non-adopters received  
               the questions in present tense. 
 
  41 
Table A5: Random Effects Hazard Rate Regression Results (Online  
   Banking) 
 
Dependent Variable: Adoption Status in Year t 
Independent Variables  Coefficient    Standard Error 
DURAT2    -0.993*     0.453 
DURAT3     0.484     0.319 
DURAT4     0.913**     0.312 
DURAT5     1.984***     0.297 
DURAT6     2.104***     0.318 
DURAT7     2.728***     0.334 
DURAT8     3.251***     0.360 
DURAT9     3.472***     0.399 
DURAT10    -0.039     1.066 
INSTALLED BASE    -0.061     0.092 
PEER INFLUENCE     0.037     0.062 
RISK    -0.273***    0.050 
TRIALABILITY     0.022     0.057 
ORIGINAL BENEFIT     0.612***     0.101 
COSTS     0.065     0.043 
MALE     0.626***     0.168 
AGE     0.025**     0.005 
CLERK     0.459*     0.187 
OPINION LEADERSHIP     0.182**     0.065 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 1 
   1.146**     0.276 
INTERNET-
APPLICATIONS 2 
   0.370     0.281 
CONSTANT    -7.874***    0.779 
Number of participants     434   
Number of observations     2,918   
Observations per group     
Min.    1   
Avg.    6.7   
Max.    10   
  
Minus log likelihood     840.13   
  42Wald chi² (20)     188.14   
   Likelihood-ratio-test     p < 0.001  
    
   Likelihood-ratio-test of rho = 0 is not rejected on a conventional level 
   (p= 0.11). 
 
Note: Asterisks indicate that coefficient is significantly different form 
zero at the 10 percent (
†), 5 percent (*), 1 percent (**), or 0.1 percent 
(***) level. 
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